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We examine the relation between acquirer and target firm ownership and the probability of a 
cross-border deal involving patents. By focusing on M&A deals involving intangible assets, 
we are better positioned to analyze technology sales. We show how different owners on the 
acquirer and the target side, and their relative position, are related to the decision to conduct a 
domestic versus cross-border transaction involving patent sales. We find that acquirer bank and 
fund ownership have very little association with cross-border M&A transactions involving 
patent sales. However, risk-averse family owners and insiders in an acquirer firm are negatively 
related to the probability if they are minority shareholders. In contrast, family owners and 
insiders have a positive association if they are the largest shareholder. We also illustrate how 
target owners shape cross-border M&A decisions. Family and fund owners in target firms are 
negatively related to the probability of a cross-border M&A transaction involving patent sales. 
This is attributable to the fact that the valuation of intangible assets can be overly complicated 
with foreign acquirers. Thus, target owners can likely secure better deals domestically.   
 







Previous literature has shown there are numerous relevant factors for mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As), both domestically and internationally (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Erel, Liao, and 
Weisbach, 2012). Cross-border transactions can bring novel benefits, but also change the costs 
associated with M&As. Cross-border M&As may also be associated with greater corporate 
governance difficulties.  
Research has also shown that the importance of ownership and control affects firms’ strategic 
choices (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Grossman, 2002; Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005; 
Cumming, Siegel, and Wright, 2007; Goranova, Dharwadkar, and Brandes, 2010). Agency 
theory highlights the two types of conflicts that determine strategic firm choices: 1) the 
Principal-Agent conflict between the manager and shareholders, and 2) the Principal-Principal 
conflict between groups of shareholders.  
Principal-Agent conflict can result when under-diversified risk-averse managers are unwilling 
to carry out risky but value-enhancing projects to increase shareholder value (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Principal-Principal conflict can result when firm owners exhibit differing risk 
preferences, such as, e.g., in terms of strategic incentives (Filatotchev and Wright, 2011). For 
example, family owners and institutional investors may differ in their overall strategic goals, 
and thus their investment objectives may also differ.  
Different owner types can also dramatically affect firm investment strategies. Institutional 
investors, depending on their type, positively affect investments in R&D and innovation 
(Bushee, 1998; Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013; Cumming, Peter, and Tarsalewska, 
2019). Hedge fund investors tend to improve innovation in investee firms (Brav, Jiang, Ma, 
and Tian, 2018). Family owners, although usually risk averse, also tend to embrace innovation 
in their firms (Morck and Yeung, 2003; Diaz-Moriana, Clinton, Kammerlander, Lumpkin, and 
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Craig, 2018). Although the literature clearly shows owners’ impact on firms’ strategic 
innovation decisions, we do not know if they influence decisions whether to buy innovation in 
cross-border M&A transactions. 
The goal of this paper is to study the Principal-Principal conflict among various groups of 
owners on the acquirer and target sides, and to explore the probability of the decision to acquire 
cross-border intangible assets in the form of patents. Acquisitions of firms with patents can 
pose significant risk to the acquirer firm. Not only do they face higher valuation risk when they 
merge and acquire intangible assets, but the integration of new technologies is often fraught 
with difficulty. Therefore, our primary research question is: Do owners of acquirer and target 
firms matter in cross-border mergers and acquisitions of firms with patents?  
To explore this question, we use a comprehensive sample of 3,311 M&A deals involving patent 
sales from the European Union (28 countries including United Kingdom) for the 2010-2018 
period. We collect ownership information for target and acquirer firms from Orbis. Our 
findings suggest that both acquirer and target owners matter in in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions of intangible assets, and reflect the differing risk preferences of the owners.  
For example, we find little evidence that acquirer bank owners are positively associated with 
the probability of cross-border M&A deals involving patents. Similarly, we find no effect of 
acquirer fund ownership. However, we find new and interesting evidence that acquirer family 
owners’ influence depends on whether they are minority or majority shareholders. Family 
owners with a minority ownership in an acquirer firm are negatively related, while they are 
positively related when they are the largest shareholder. Acquirer insiders are negatively 
associated with the probability of a cross-border M&A deal involving patents only if they are 
minority shareholders.  
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In the case of target firm owners, we find that only funds and family owners have a negative 
and statistically significant association with the probability of cross-border M&A deals 
involving patents. There is also some evidence that target corporate owners have a positive 
assosiation.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in two key ways. First, we supplement prior research by 
showing that owners on both sides matter in cross-border M&A decisions involving patent 
sales. Ferreira, Massa, and Matos (2009) show that foreign institutional shareholders increase 
the probability that a deal will be cross-border. Cao, Cumming, Qian, and Wang (2015) show 
that deals involving institutional investors are more likely to be cross-border if creditor rights 
are stronger and antidirector rights are weaker. Finally, Chen, Hobdari, and Zhang (2019) show 
empirically that the heterogeneous preferences of owners of U.S. acquirer firms affect cross-
border M&A decisions. Second, we show that whether owners are part of a block, or are the 
largest shareholder, matters.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the data and our summary 
statistics in section 2. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1. Data and sample selection 
We examine the relation between acquirer and target ownership and the choice of cross-border 
versus domestic acquisitions that involve patent sales. We begin by collecting deal data from 
Bureau van Dijk’s (BvD) Zephyr Merger and Acquisition database. We first select all M&A 
deals with the sub-type: patent sale. This gives us an initial sample of 17,210 transactions for 
2010 through 2018. Of those transactions, we next choose completed deals. We are interested 
in change of ownership, so we choose deals where the initial stake is less than 50%, and the 
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final stake is higher than 50%. We also choose countries where the acquirer is from one of 28 
EU countries (including the United Kingdom). This gives a sample of 4,495 M&A deals.  
Subsequently, we collect data on ownership from the BvD Orbis database for 2010-2018. Orbis 
provides information on the type of shareholders and their direct and voting rights. After 
merging with the ownership data, we are left with 4,221 deals. We exclude any deals with 
missing information on deal characteristics, which leaves us with a final sample of 3,311.  
Table 1 shows the sample distributions by announcement year for our 2010-2018 sample in 
panel A, by industry in panel B, and by country in panel C. Column (1) shows all deals, column 
(2) shows cross-border deals, and column (3) shows non-cross-border deals by year. We 
observe that the number of M&A deals grows steadily until 2016, and then drops back to 2010 
levels. The largest amount of deals is in manufacturing industry followed by services industry. 
The top three acquirer countries are United Kingdom, Germany, and France.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 gives the summary statistics in panel A, and correlations in panel B. Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix. We measure ownership of acquirer and target firms in the fiscal 
year immediately preceding the announcement year. Acquirer firms on average are owned 
2.69% by banks, 7.52% by funds, 10.86% by families, 32.77% by corporates, and 0.32% by 
insiders. The ownership percentages differ from those in Chen, Hobdari, and Zhang (2019), 
who focus on U.S. acquirers. This is mainly because of the differences in ownership models in 
the U.S., where more dispersed ownership is popular, and in the EU, where many firms are 
family-owned. Target firms on average are owned 1.69% by banks, 4.53% by funds, 8.27% by 
families, 47.15% by corporates, and 0.26% by insiders.  
The main control variables in our regressions are acquirer age (LNAGE), asset size (ASSETS), 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer and the target are in the same industry, and 0 
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otherwise (SAME_IND), if the transaction was paid in cash (CASH) or stock (STOCK), and if 
the acquirer or target firms are publicly listed (TRG_LISTED, ACQ_LISTED). Firms on 
average are 22 years old and have assets of 100,710 th euros. 47% have acquirer and target 
firms from the same industry, approximately 19% (17%) of transactions are paid in cash 
(stock), 34% of acquirer firms are listed, and 1% of target firms are listed.   
Thus, the probability of a cross-border deal involving patent sale is significantly and positively 
correlated with acquirer bank ownership, and significantly and negatively correlated with 
acquirer family, acquirer corporation, target funds, and target family ownership. The remaining 
control variables have correlations with the probability of a cross-border deal at levels ranging 
from 4% to 21%.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
2.2. Methodology 
To empirically test how acquirer and target ownership affects the probability of cross-border 
transactions, we estimate the regression equation with fixed effects and clustered standard 
errors at industry level using a Probit model, as follows: 
CB_DEAL = α +βOwnership + Controls + Fixed Effects + ε   (1) 
where the dependent variable CB_DEAL is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A 
transaction involving a patent sale is a cross-border deal, and 0 otherwise. The main 
independent variables are types of ownership: banks, funds, families, corporations, and insider 
status of the acquirer or target firm. Following previous studies, we also include a set of 
controls, and we cluster standard errors at the industry level (Chen, Hobdari, and Zhang, 2019). 
We include two sets of fixed effects. First, we control for industry and year. Second, we also 




Next, we construct four different measures of ownership: 1) total percentage held by a 
particular owner type (aggregate owner); 2) a dummy variable that equals 1 if a particular 
owner type holds a block of 5% or 3) 10%, and 0 otherwise; and 4) a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if a particular owner type is the largest owner, and 0 otherwise.  
3. Results and discussion 
3.1. Main results 
Table 3 reports the results for the association between acquirer ownership and cross-border 
deal probability. Different acquirer owners have different effects on the probability of 
CB_DEAL. Acquirer bank ownership is positively related to CB_DEAL, but it is only 
significant when ownership is measured as an aggregate percentage and if the bank has 10% 
block or if it is the largest owner (in models 7 and 8). Similarly to Chen, Hobdari, and Zhang’s 
(2019) reasoning, this may mitigate the conflict between banks and management. Acquirer 
fund ownership has no association with cross-border deal probability. This might be due to the 
fact that mutual funds are typically focused on returns, and can change their positions quickly 
if the forecasted M&A transaction is not likely to benefit them.  
We find interesting results for acquirer family ownership. Aggregate and block ownership 
generally exhibit a negative and statistically significant association with CB_DEAL, suggesting 
that family owners are less likely to undertake risk and engage in cross-border M&A 
transactions involving patent sales. However, if a family is the largest owner, it tends to have 
a positive and statistically significant association with CB_DEAL. This reflects the non-linear 
U-shaped relation that exists between family ownership and a firm’ risk taking, as found in 
Lee, Chae, and Lee (2018). They posit that, when families are minority owners, they take less 
risk because they value private benefits more. When they are majority owners, their interests 
are better aligned with the value-enhancing strategy of undertaking riskier projects.  
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We find that acquirer corporate ownership has a positive and statistically significant relation 
with the cross-border probability of M&A transactions involving patent sales only if the 
corporate owner is the largest owner or has a block (model 7). Acquirer insider ownership has 
a negative and statistically significant association CB_DEAL if they are minority owners or 
have a 5% block; and they have a positive association with CB_DEAL if they are the largest 
owner. This reflects an attitude similar to that of family owners: As undiversified risk-averse 
insiders, such as, e.g., employees, managers, and directors, they may act in their own benefit 
and avoid risky projects. Other controls are as expected. Firms are more likely to engage in 
cross-border deals if they are larger, in the same industry, when the acquirer is listed, and when 
the target is unlisted.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 4 presents the results on the effect of target ownership on cross-border M&A deals 
involving patent sale probability. Firms with fund ownership and family ownership are less 
likely to be targets in cross-border acquisitions including intangible assets. These results are 
consistent and statistically significant irrespective of the ownership definition, but they are 
more economically significant when the family or fund owner is the largest shareholder.  
Greenwood and Schor (2009) show for a U.S. sample that hedge fund activists are more likely 
to force investee firms to be targets in acquisitions because of the potentially large positive 
returns to the target firm. Our results complement this evidence. We show that funds are 
generally interested in selling their shares in target firms, but less so in the case of cross-border 
deals including intangible assets. The intuition is that intangible assets are usually less 
profitable if sold to a foreign, rather than domestic, acquirer. We also find an increase in the 
probability of a cross-border M&A deal involving a patent sale if the owner is a corporation.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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Our results are robust to including different sets of fixed effects as well different types of 
clustering by country and industry, and both.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper explores the role of acquirer and target owners in cross-border M&A decisions 
involving patent sales. We find that acquirer and target owners, and their relative positions, are 
related to the decision to conduct a domestic versus cross-border merger or acquisition 
involving patent sales. Acquirer bank and fund ownership have little association with cross-
border M&A transactions involving patent sales. Risk-averse family owners and insiders in 
acquirer firms have are negatively related if they are minority shareholders, but family owners 
and insiders are positively related if they are the largest shareholder.  
We also show that target firm owners have an important role in shaping cross-border M&A 
decisions. Family and fund owners in target firms are negatively related to the probability of 
cross-border M&A transactions involving patent sales. We attribute these results to the notion 
that the valuation of intangible assets can be overly complicated with foreign acquirers, and 
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Table 1  
Sample Distribution 
This table presents the sample distribution by year. It includes 3,311 completed mergers and acquisitions from the 
Zephyr database for the 2010-2018 period, where the initial stake is less than 50% and the final stake is higher 
than 50%. Acquirers must be from one of 28 European Union countries. Column (1) shows all deals, column (2) 
shows only cross-border (CB) deals, and column (3) shows only non-cross-border (non-CB) deals. In Panel A we 
present distribution by year, in Panel B by industry, and in Panel C by country.  
 
Panel A. Distribution by year 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Year Number of deals Number of CB deals Number of non-CB 
deals 
2010 265 128 137 
2011 360 194 166 
2012 369 184 185 
2013 332 143 189 
2014 370 170 200 
2015 459 242 217 
2016 592 345 247 
2017 339 208 131 
2018 225 134 91 
Total 3,311 1,748 1,563 
 
Panel B. Distribution by industry 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Industry Number of 
deals 
Number of CB 
deals 
Number of non-CB 
deals 
Agriculture (00-09) 15 7 8 
Construction (15-17) 77 21 56 
Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate 231 102 129 
Manufacturing (20-39) 1,966 1,169 797 
Mining (10-14) 37 17 20 
Public Administration (91-99) 9 7 2 
Retail Trade (52-59) 46 15 31 
Services (70-89) 660 313 347 
Transportation, Communications (40-49) 131 50 81 








Panel C. Distribution by country 
 
 (1) 



































Summary Statistics and Correlations 
This table reports summary statistics in panel A and Pearson correlations in panel B. Variable definitions are in 
the Appendix. * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.  
 
Panel A. Summary statistics  
 
 (1) (2) 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
ACQ_BANKS 2.69 11.40 
ACQ_FUNDS 7.52 21.79 
ACQ_FAMILY 10.86 28.75 
ACQ_CORP 32.77 45.54 
ACQ_INSIDER 0.32 4.62 
TRG_BANKS 1.69 11.05 
TRG_FUNDS 4.53 18.95 
TRG_FAMILY 8.27 25.78 
TRG_CORP 47.15 54.09 
TRG_INSIDER 0.26 4.35 
LNAGE 3.11 1.05 
ASSETS 11.52 3.15 
SAME_IND 0.47 0.50 
CASH 0.19 0.39 
STOCK 0.17 0.37 
TRG_LISTED 0.01 0.08 
ACQ_LISTED 0.34 0.47 
 
Panel B. Correlations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
1 CB_DEAL 1.00           
2 ACQ_BANKS 0.06* 1.00          
3 ACQ_FUNDS -0.03 0.01 1.00         
4 ACQ_FAMILY -0.16* -0.06* -0.08* 1.00        
5 ACQ_CORP -0.04* -0.14* -0.19* -0.24* 1.00       
6 ACQ_INSIDER -0.03 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.04* 1.00      
7 TRG_BANKS 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 1.00     
8 TRG_FUNDS -0.04* 0.06* 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 1.00    
9 TRG_FAMILY -0.06* -0.02 -0.00 0.03* -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 1.00   
10 TRG_CORP 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.06* 0.02 -0.06* -0.16* -0.20* 1.00  
11 TRG_INSIDER 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.15* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 1.00 
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Table 3. Cross-Border Patent Sales in M&A Transactions and Acquirer Firm Ownership 
This table gives the results of a Probit regression of cross-border deals involving the sale of intangible assets. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 for a 
cross-border deal, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects in model (1) to (4) and country x industry 
x year fixed effects in model (5) to (8). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust errors corrected for clustering of observations at the industry level. The economic significance 
of the main variables is in brackets underneath the standard errors. It represents the marginal effect on the probability of a CBA for a 1-standard deviation change in a continuous 

























BANKS 0.003** 0.091 0.051 0.247 0.006*** 0.146** 0.086 0.397*** 
 (2.03) (1.54) (1.20) (1.36) (3.41) (2.36) (1.24) (3.87) 
FUNDS -0.001 -0.053 0.024 0.032 -0.001 -0.001 0.080 0.128 
 (-1.51) (-0.57) (0.28) (0.23) (-0.52) (-0.01) (1.23) (1.60) 
FAMILY -0.004*** -0.289*** -0.283*** 0.211*** -0.003*** -0.189*** -0.176*** 0.236*** 
 (-4.01) (-6.54) (-9.37) (7.34) (-3.30) (-5.54) (-6.41) (5.85) 
CORP -0.000 0.018 0.038 0.212** -0.000 0.007 0.036** 0.323*** 
 (-0.06) (0.63) (1.61) (2.20) (-0.28) (0.30) (2.32) (2.71) 
INSIDER -0.006*** -0.200 -0.308*** 0.107 -0.002 -0.033 -0.243*** 0.238*** 
 (-2.97) (-1.17) (-3.49) (1.41) (-1.48) (-0.31) (-5.53) (4.58) 
LNAGE -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.014 0.038 0.036 0.038 0.033 
 (-0.22) (-0.29) (-0.28) (-0.72) (1.33) (1.19) (1.29) (1.14) 
ASSETS 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.078** 0.079*** 0.080** 0.081** 0.081** 0.078** 
 (2.65) (2.59) (2.54) (2.61) (2.20) (2.18) (2.13) (2.05) 
SAME_IND 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.118*** 
 (3.28) (3.12) (3.05) (3.21) (3.65) (3.81) (3.78) (3.62) 
CASH 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.013 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.32) (0.28) (0.28) (0.17) 
STOCK 0.056 0.063 0.064 0.078 0.056 0.061 0.061 0.076 
 (0.48) (0.53) (0.54) (0.68) (0.44) (0.48) (0.49) (0.62) 
TRG_LISTED -0.563*** -0.564*** -0.567*** -0.563*** -1.179** -1.182** -1.194** -1.173** 
 (-4.63) (-4.72) (-4.67) (-4.39) (-2.24) (-2.31) (-2.29) (-2.18) 
ACQ_LISTED 0.264*** 0.284*** 0.289*** 0.301*** 0.249*** 0.262*** 0.264*** 0.227*** 
 (4.48) (6.96) (6.94) (6.76) (3.12) (4.29) (4.47) (5.61) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes     
Country x industry x year FE     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,311 3,311 3,311 3,311 3,311 3,311 3,311 3,311 
Pseudo R-sq 0.092 0.091 0.091 0.089 0.296 0.294 0.294 0.295 
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Table 4. Cross-Border Patent Sales in M&A Transactions and Target Firm Ownership 
This table gives the results of a Probit regression of cross-border deals involving the sale of intangible assets. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 for a 
cross-border deal, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. All regressions control for industry and year fixed effects in model (1) to (4) and country x industry 
x year fixed effects in model (5) to (8). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust errors corrected for clustering of observations at the industry level. The economic significance 
of the main variables is in brackets underneath the standard errors. It represents the marginal effect on the probability of a CBA for a 1-standard deviation change in a continuous 

























BANKS 0.001 0.027 0.074 0.015 0.003 0.084 0.158** 0.093 
 (0.30) (0.17) (1.08) (0.14) (0.81) (0.40) (2.11) (0.82) 
FUNDS -0.003*** -0.270*** -0.219*** -0.226*** -0.004*** -0.447*** -0.397*** -0.336*** 
 (-4.43) (-6.30) (-3.95) (-3.73) (-6.06) (-6.11) (-5.52) (-5.13) 
FAMILY -0.003*** -0.238*** -0.205*** -0.240*** -0.004*** -0.310*** -0.265*** -0.362*** 
 (-3.19) (-4.62) (-3.54) (-6.15) (-2.61) (-4.22) (-3.58) (-3.76) 
CORP 0.000* 0.045** 0.068** 0.053 0.000** 0.060** 0.084*** 0.071** 
 (1.75) (1.97) (2.57) (1.34) (2.24) (2.23) (2.68) (2.45) 
INSIDER 0.000 0.064 0.154 -0.240 0.008 0.609 0.675*** 0.143 
 (0.07) (0.48) (1.31) (-1.06) (1.33) (1.32) (3.91) (0.41) 
LNAGE -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 0.034** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 
 (-0.90) (-0.91) (-0.98) (-1.13) (2.55) (2.89) (2.83) (2.62) 
ASSETS 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 
 (4.85) (4.82) (4.82) (4.98) (4.12) (4.11) (4.15) (4.26) 
SAME_IND 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.125*** 0.123*** 0.128*** 0.131*** 
 (3.02) (3.03) (3.15) (3.18) (4.16) (4.17) (4.62) (4.69) 
CASH 0.010 0.022 0.023 0.027 0.024 0.036 0.041 0.042 
 (0.22) (0.46) (0.50) (0.60) (0.70) (1.09) (1.25) (1.20) 
STOCK 0.073 0.081 0.077 0.075 0.074 0.088 0.086 0.076 
 (1.27) (1.40) (1.31) (1.25) (1.03) (1.35) (1.24) (1.07) 
TRG_LISTED -0.604*** -0.555*** -0.574*** -0.557*** -1.202*** -1.100*** -1.160*** -1.209*** 
 (-5.57) (-5.58) (-5.41) (-5.05) (-3.34) (-3.27) (-3.36) (-3.66) 
ACQ_LISTED 0.315*** 0.316*** 0.318*** 0.313*** 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.298*** 0.299*** 
 (20.07) (20.22) (19.93) (19.05) (15.05) (15.30) (14.74) (14.07) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes     
Country x industry x year FE     Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,311 3,311 3,311 3,311 3,311 3,311 3,311 3,311 
Pseudo R-sq 0.090 0.091 0.090 0.090 0.298 0.300 0.300 0.298 
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Appendix A1. Variable Definitions  
Variable Name Definition [Source] 
CB_DEAL Dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal involving the sale of intangible assets is 
cross-border, and 0 otherwise. [Zephyr] 
ACQ_BANKS  
TRG_BANKS 
Proportion of shares owned by banks in the acquirer or target firm. [Orbis] 
ACQ_FUNDS  
TRG_FUNDS 
Proportion of shares owned by funds in the acquirer or target firm. [Orbis] 
ACQ_FAMILY 
TRG_FAMILY 
Proportion of shares owned by a family in the acquirer or target firm. [Orbis] 
ACQ_CORP  
TRG_CORP 
Proportion of shares owned by corporates in the acquirer or target firm. [Orbis] 
ACQ_INSIDER 
TRG_INSIDER 
Proportion of shares owned by insiders (i.e., employees, managers, directors) in 
the acquirer or target firm. [Orbis] 
LNAGE Logarithm of the market value of assets in thousands of euros. [Zephyr] 
ASSETS  
SAME_IND Dummy variable that equals 1 if acquirer and target are in the same industry, and 
0 otherwise. [Zephyr] 
CASH Dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal payment is financed by cash, and 0 
otherwise. [Zephyr] 
STOCK Dummy variable that equals 1if the deal payment is financed by stock, and 0 
otherwise. [Zephyr] 
TRG_LISTED Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target’s status is unlisted, and 0 otherwise. 
[Zephyr] 
ACQ_LISTED Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target’s status is unlisted, and 0 otherwise. 
[Zephyr] 
 
